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Prevention of occupational injuries is an important task of Human Resource Management. Empiric 
research showed that risk perception, safety communication and worker’s participation in safety programs 
may have a relevant role in reducing accident and injury occurrence – see for example (Conchie, 2013). 
These considerations lead us to this study to propose a new methodology which consists in an index 
aimed to assess the proactivity of worker participation in safety management systems. The innovation 
consists in defining a diagnostic measurement model to assess the degree of workforce proactivity, 
considering a specific kind of participatory contribute by workers for safety promotion in the workplace, like 
the spontaneous risk-reporting initiatives. The measurement tool has been defined and tested by an 
interdisciplinary team composed of four university researchers (human factor experts) and two site safety 
managers of a chemical site which is chosen with the purpose to apply for the first time the new tool. 
Preliminary results show that different levels of proactivity were adopted and that the highest levels of 
proactivity are relatively less frequent. The tool offers relevant diagnostic information for the industrial 
organizations which aim to achieve higher level of proactivity in risk management, offering practical 
indications for managerial interventions focused on stimulating and improving appropriate participation by 
the workforce.  
1. Introduction: the relevance of safety participation in industrial settings 
The importance of a proactive approach toward safety management in accident reduction and injury 
prevention has been stressed in organizational behavior and ergonomics sciences by different authors in 
the last fifteen years, beyond the reactive organizational activities related to correction and monitoring of 
risk factors in the workplace (Hollnagel et al., 2011). All these studies underlined the importance of 
considering the positive adaptive contributions of single workers and work teams in achieving the desired 
level of safety and organizational resilience beyond the mere compliance with norms and procedures.  
The present contribution is aimed to offer a conceptual model and an assessment tool to describe the 
characteristics of proactivity as a specific attribute of workforce participation in safety promotion in 
industrial settings. Conceptualized as “promoting the safety program within the workplace, demonstrating 
initiative and putting effort into improving safety in the workplace” (Neal and Griffin, 2006), the importance 
of employee participation has been recognized as a fundamental aspect of safety performance in 
organizational settings (Saracino et al., 2012a). While safety compliance behavior involves engaging in 
behaviors that may be viewed as part of an employee’s work role, safety participation involves a greater 
voluntary element, so that it may substantially differ from safety compliance behaviors. Indeed, safety 
participation is very important to guarantee safety maintenance in those situations characterized by high 
risk uncertainty and unpredictability, especially in situations where safety standard procedures may be 
weak in coping with the changeable shape of risks and hazards, and in those industrial situations 
characterized by high conflict between production and safety instances (Hollnagel et al., 2011). 
1.1 A quantitative assessment of safety participation in risk management 
Whereas previous research was focused on describing different behavioral patterns and taxonomies of 
safety participation and extra-role safety behavior (e.g. safety citizenship; safety voice; safety initiative) 
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(Conchie, 2013), the current paper proposes a different approach and a conceptual advancement in 
defining a general assessment tool aimed at evaluating a set of different features that entail different 
degrees of proactivity in participative efforts and initiatives enacted by workers in safety management 
systems. The general features of “Proactive Safety Behaviors in the workplace” (PRO.SA.BE’s) will be 
discussed below.  
1.2 The conceptual features of safety proactivity in risk management 
The present conceptual and methodological contribution proposes to investigate the proactive safety 
behaviors (PRO.SA.BE’s) as a specific kind of positive behavioral initiative by individuals aimed to improve 
the safety conditions in the workplace. In this perspective, PRO.SA.BE’s involves at least three general 
specific attributes discussed in organizational behavior and industrial psychology literature (Parker and 
Collins, 2010). First, given its self-started nature, proactive behavior of employees generally does not need 
to be formally prescribed to be enacted, nor does it require detailed instructions or formal requests. We 
could conceptualize a proactive safety behavior as self-started and self-determined. Despite this, many 
kinds of participative behaviors are usually strongly recommended by managements and organizations 
(i.e. spontaneous reporting of potential risk and near-misses; initiative suggestion for improvements; 
supporting safety activities by colleagues and supervisors), but they can hardly be prescribed or designed 
in advance for every situation or circumstance that requires them, because it is impossible to predict every 
form of risk factors in complex work environment. This space for self-started initiative by work operators 
may become essential when standardization may not be sufficient to cover aprioristically all the possible 
situations which can generate and manifest threats for safety of people and work-environment. Secondly, 
as anticipatory and future-oriented, proactive behavior involves acting in advance of a future situation, 
rather than just reacting to solve contingent problems or adjusting to an unpredictable situation. These 
proactive safety behaviors could be characterized by the substantial amount of anticipation activity by 
work-operators aimed at envisioning and preventing future problems (Parker et al., 2010), avoiding 
potential risk situations and the actualization of their negative consequences in the workplace, like 
production and safety breakdowns, property damages, minor and severe injuries. Thirdly, proactive safety 
behaviors are intrinsically meant to create improvements to the actual work and organizational situation. 
Thus, as a change-oriented behavior, behaving proactively means trying to improve one’s own work 
situation and organizational context, and make things happen rather than just waiting for something to 
happen for the initiative of someone else.  
1.3 Different levels of proactivity of workforce participation in risk management 
Considering the different facets of proactivity in the research domain of occupational safety, we aim to 
propose an assessment tool which enables researchers and practitioners to measure the levels of 
proactive involvement in a particular kind of participative and discretional activity in risk management in 
organizations on the basis of existing scientific models (reported in the 2-nd and 3-rd column of Table 1). 
The degree of proactivity is measured from a minimum degree of presence of proactivity attributes (i.e. 
spontaneous report of potential risk factors), to a maximal degree of presence of proactivity attributes (i.e. 
spontaneous report of risk factors with taking charge initiative suggestion for improvement). Table 1 
represents the different degrees of proactivity here defined (from level one to level five) considering two 
theoretical models: the model of Parker and Collins (2010) on attributes of proactive behavior and the 
model of Hollnagel and colleagues (2011) on safety resilience capabilities. The conceptual rationales to 
build the 5 levels of proactivity reported in Table 1 are described in the following paragraphs, with more 
conceptual details and real examples from organizational life in industrial settings. In a human factor 
perspective, within organizational behaviors, proactive ones are characterized by being self-started, 
anticipatory and taking charge (Parker and Collins, 2010). Within the three characteristics listed above, 
taking charge in organizational behavior is the most distinctive, as it can generate improvement and then 
generalized learning. Moreover, as argued by Parker and colleagues (2010), proactivity should not only be 
“taking charge”, but it should also create a visible impact. Thus, in this study we propose to split into two 
parts the “taking charge” level, so that the first one includes the actions that create an impact in terms of 
change (max level: 4) and the second one entails those actions limited to “taking charge” (level 3). As the 
same time, the ergonomics considers both anticipation and learning such as proactivity elements 
(Hollnagel et al., 2011). Consequently, crossing ergonomics and organizational behavior, we consider 
implicit the aspect of learning as a vehicle for positive change, while the anticipation element is assumed 
to be below the “taking charge” and above the “self-started”. Finally, considering a zero level of proactivity, 
such as reports related to the formal pressure (because the report is a statutory requirement, the omission 
of which is punishable, therefore it is not proactive as supported by the scientific literature), we want to 
distinguish, by definition, compliance and proactivity. With these scientific bases, we obtained the five 
levels of proactivity in an ordinal scale (not necessarily at equivalent intervals), as proposed in the Table 1.  
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 Table 1: Proactive participation in risk management: conceptual foundations and comparisons  
Proactivity levels                            
in risk-reporting 
Attributes of proactivity 
(see Parker & Collins, 2010) 
Resilience capabilities 
(see Hollnagel et al.,2011) 
Level one 
Spontaneous reporting activities 
of contingent risk factors in the 
workplace 
Low proactivity 
(spontaneousness) 
Monitoring 
(addressing the critical) 
monitoring  if something affect 
the operative abilities 
Level two 
Self-started problem solving to 
correct current discrepancies 
from the standards 
 
Self-started 
Undertaking a course of actions 
without no need to be asked to 
act 
 
Responding 
(addressing the actual) 
reacting to variability and 
disturbances 
Level three 
Anticipatory problem prevention 
of risk consequences 
 
Future-oriented 
Acting in advance of a future 
situation, rather than just 
reacting 
 
Anticipating 
(addressing the potential) 
envisioning developments that 
lie further into the future  
Level four 
Initiatives and suggestions for 
safety improvement of the 
current risk management 
 
Taking-charge 
Taking control and causing 
something to happen, rather 
than just adapting or waiting  for 
something to happen 
 
Learning 
(addressing the factual) 
Improving future performance 
experimenting changes as 
results  of new experiences 
Level five 
Improvement generalization in 
the broader organization 
 
Observable improvement 
outcomes 
 
 
-- 
1.4 Operative examples of the different levels of proactivity  
Therefore the five levels of proactivity are: 1) spontaneous reporting activities of contingent risk factors in 
the workplace. An example of this first level of proactivity may be a simple spontaneous reporting of a 
potential danger. For instance, an operator may indicate an event or condition that can present a negative 
result in a hazard, without acting directly to improve or solve the problem; 2) Self-started problem solving 
to correct current discrepancies from the standards. An example might be a worker’s advisor which also 
includes the description of actions aimed to correct immediately a potentially dangerous situation. For 
instance, the operator attempts to correct by himself the reported event, by eliminating the current situation 
of potential danger; 3) Anticipatory problem prevention related to the possible future consequences of risk 
factors. Beyond signaling or correcting the dangerous situation, the operator reports and describes 
possible concatenations and negative consequences of these critical events, thus providing useful 
information to anticipate the negative consequences of a problem before they occurrence; 4) Initiatives 
and suggestions for safety improvement of the current risk management in addition to correcting and 
anticipating the risk factors, an operator may propose one or more suggestions to improve the situation so 
that the problem won't come around in the future. For instance, the operator can act directly the proposed 
solution or he may simply present his ideas for improvement to supervisors if he is not enable or allowed to 
implement the proposals by himself; 5) Generalization of the stimulated improvement in the broader 
organization setting. The operator proposes or produces a solution that actually improves the situation of 
an area or a department of the company. Following the report of the operator, the EHS management staff 
might produce a change or innovation that represents a stable, generalizable and permanent improvement 
in relation to the technological structure, organizational practices and working behaviors. As in many 
organizational settings, risk reporting could be considered an expected or mandatory activity (level one). 
We will consider intermediate levels of proactivity, characterized by the presence of self-started proactive 
problem solving activity to address the risk and anticipatory envisioning that allows the prevention of 
possible future consequences associated with a specific risk. The final level of proactivity is here defined 
by the extension of generalizability of the employees’ stimulation to the broader organizational context. 
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2. Assessing safety proactivity with PRISM scale 
2.1 Aim and Method  
Research was carried out to assess the basic psychometric properties of our tool, labeled as PRISM Scale 
(acronym of: Proactive Risk Management): in particular, we wanted to analyze the inter-raters reliability of 
the grid. On the basis of the proactivity theoretical models, an expert created grid questions which were 
analyzed and modified by two different judges, specialized on safety. The developed scale was composed 
by 15 items (5-point Likert items; 1=Strongly disagree; 2=Disagree; 3= Neither agree nor disagree; 
4=Agree; 5= Strongly agree), that assess the five different facets of proactivity: 1) Spontaneous reporting 
activities of contingent risk factors in the workplace (three items); 2) Self-started problem solving to correct 
current discrepancies in the standards (three items); 3) Anticipatory problem prevention related to the 
possible future consequences of risk factors (three items); 4) Initiatives and suggestions for safety 
improvement of the current risk management (three items); 5) Generalization of the stimulated 
improvement in the broader organization setting (three items).  
30 risk-reporting advices were collected in a chemical plant that produces plastic additives for the 
agriculture sector. Four judges, consisting of practitioners with experience in plant safety and in proactive 
behaviors, evaluated the advices on the basis of PRISM scale. Judges were trained to use the proactive 
grid, to identify proactive construct and to calibrate their ratings. Every judge worked alone in coding 
process, read a risk-reporting advice and rated one case after the other. Ratings were independent and 
blind in respect to other judges evaluations. Therefore a 4 (judges) X 30 (risk-reporting advices) X12 
(items of assessment grid) data matrix was obtained.  
This research requires the assessment of inter-rater reliability (IRR) to demonstrate consistency among 
observational ratings provided by multiple coders. 
In literature there are numerous reliability studies with diverse statistical approaches. There are various 
tests for different type of reliability data. Although there is a good degree of consensus about how to treat 
the categorized data, there is less consensus regarding ordinal and continuous data which forms the 
object of the present paper. Hallgren (2012) suggests the intra-class correlation index (ICC) that is one of 
the most used statistics for assessing IRR for ordinal, interval, and ratio variables in studies where there 
are two or more coders. ICC index incorporates the magnitude of both agreements and disagreements. 
Higher ICC values indicate greater IRR: an ICC of 1 indicates a perfect agreement and an ICC of 0 shows 
only random agreement. Cicchetti (1994) proposed that ICC values less than 0.40 are insufficient, fair are 
the values between 0.40 and 0.59, good the values between .60 and 0.74, and excellent between 0.75 and 
1.0. Since our rating procedures involve the use of two or more judges, reliability is quantified on averages 
of ratings provided by several coders; so we tested the reliability of the aggregations that is often identified 
as ICC(2).  
The average measure inter classes correlation was computed by SPSS of IBM (2011). The software 
estimates the single measure interclass correlation coefficient by: 
 
(1) 
A(1-)100% confidence interval is given by: 
 
(2) 
2.2 Results 
For each level of the scale (using 15 items), the ICC was computed on the basis of 30 risk-reporting 
advices valued by four raters. Table 2 presents reliability data for the overall rating and for every scale 
level. Results show good values for level 2 and level 4. Excellent are the reliability indexes for the 
remaining levels. Excellent is the psychometric quality of the overall index too. The average measure ICC 
ranged from .187 to .941. Results show excellent reliability values for 8 items, good for 3 items, fair for 2 
items and insufficient for the other 2 items. The items that show an inadequate value of ICC say: “Was the 
event actually totally unpredictable without signaling by the operator?” and “Did the operator provide 
information to anticipate future occurrence of the same problem?”. The judges’ evaluation of 
unpredictability was not consistent as much as the codify of anticipation of future occurrence. These could 
be the hardest tasks for the judges. 
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Table 2: The PRISM assessment tool: inter-rater reliability ratings (average measure ICC) 
 Check-list levels and items ICC 95% Confidence Interval
   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
 Level zero: spontaneous risk-reporting (expected by 
legal regulations) 
.907 .851 .945 
L0_1 Is the reported risk relevant for areas, activities and 
duties beyond the roles and competence by the 
operator? 
.722 .459 .875 
L0_2 Did the operator report "spontaneously" situations of 
risk, without specific indications of superiors or 
colleagues? 
.465 .000 .754 
L0_3 Did the operator report an event without having 
previously received specific instructions to the event by 
the organization? 
.789 .572 .906 
 Level 1: self-started problem solving .874 .814 .918 
L1_1 Did the operator provide information to solve the 
contingent event? 
.604 .241 .818 
L1_2 Did the operator try to solve in the first contingent event? .941 .883 .974 
L1_3 Did the operator eliminate the contingent situation of risk 
/ potential danger? 
.922 .849 .965 
 Level 2: anticipatory problem prevention .690 .547 .796 
L2_1 Was the event actually totally unpredictable without 
signaling by the operator? 
.378 .000 .714 
L2_2 Does the operator provide useful information to 
anticipate the negative consequences of the contingent 
event? 
.796 .609 .906 
L2_3 Does the operator provide information to anticipate 
future occurrence of the same problem? 
.187 .000 .626 
 Level 3: taking-charge suggestion .852 .783 .902 
L3_1 Does the operator make suggestions for tackling the 
problem in the event of recurrence in the future? 
.815 .645 .915 
L3_2 Does the operator express valid suggestions to ensure 
that the problem does not recur in the future? 
.831 .677 922 
L3_3 Does the operator provide innovative suggestions (not 
currently covered) to ensure that the event does not 
happen again? 
.892 .793 .950 
 Level 4: improvement generalization .693 .550 .799 
L4_1 Does the operator propose a solution that produces or 
generates an improvement / increase the safety of his 
workplace? 
.773 .560 .898 
L4_2 Does the operator propose or produce a solution that 
improves the safety of the working environment 
generalizable to the entire department? 
.510 .062 .775 
L4_3 Does the operator propose or produce a solution that 
improves the safety of the working environment 
generalizable to the entire plant? 
.615 .263 .823 
 Overall  .817 .781 .848 
3. Conclusions 
The issue of safety at work is very timely. Despite occupational accidents are stochastic events difficult to 
predict, their occurrence rate may be reduced. One possible solution could be a proactive approach 
toward safety management based on anticipation and learning organizational mechanisms, as has been 
stressed in human factors and ergonomics sciences (see for example Hollnagel et al., 2012). Therefore 
the aim of this study was to propose a new methodology using an index that measures the degree of 
proactivity of worker participation in safety management systems. The role of proactivity in safety was 
widely discussed in the first part of this paper.  
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The present article shows results regarding the evaluation of an assessment tool that investigates 
proactive safety behaviours (PRO.SA.BE’s). The scale includes 15 items and overall it has good reliability 
values: the study also highlights that single levels of the scale have a good reliability.  
The instrument presented in this study can therefore be considered a useful tool to monitor the levels of 
worker participation in risk management. Through the integration of quantitative measures (i.e., frequency 
of problems solved or anticipated in the safety area) and qualitative measures (that is the five levels of 
proactivity described herein), the tool allows a greater understanding of workers' participation in safety. 
This last aspect can make this tool suitable for companies, RSPP and other safety figures intended to 
monitor the workers' participation and build up appropriate measures to improve the participation itself and 
proactivity towards safety in line with the current regulations (HIS, 2008).  
The tool can help the achievement of an higher level of proactivity in risk management in industrial 
organizations, also stimulating reflection on possible interventions which can raise awareness and 
participation of workers on this issue. Interventions may be both formative and focused on the continuous 
improvement of the safety management system or based on defining incentive strategies of the behaviors 
that promote safety (Saracino et al., 2012b). 
The promotion of the participation can trigger a virtuous cycle that feeds on itself in increased participation, 
greater organizational support (see. Mariani and Battistelli, 2011) with positive effects on workers' safe 
behavior, and encouraging learning opportunities in the security field (Mariani et al., 2013). 
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